Future OE Mission Command and Future OE Decision Cycles by James, John
M A Y  1 6 ,  2 0 1 9 M A Y  1 6 ,  2 0 1 9  B Y  U S E R  
145. Future OE Mission Command and Future OE 
Decision Cycles 
[Editor’s Note: Today’s guest blog post by Dr. John James is the second in the Mad 
Scientist Laboratory’s two-part discussion addressing the Army’s network requirements 
for rapidly and continuously integrating multi-domain capabilities, enabling effective 
mission command, and facilitating disciplined initiative against near-peer threats in the 
future.  In his post, Dr. James focuses on the complementary impacts that the Internet 
of Things (IoT) and Fifth Generation (5G) telecommunications will have on mission 
command in the Future Operational Environment (OE), the opportunities they will 
present our commanders in seizing and exploiting the cyberspace high ground, and 
their associated vulnerabilities — Enjoy!] 
“Plans are worthless, but planning is everything” — General Dwight David 
Eisenhower describing planning for military operations[4], [5] 
INTRODUCTION 
Enormous commercial, academic, and governmental resources are being expended to 
build machines which can autonomously assist humans in a variety of complex tasks 
(e.g., drive cars, fly aircraft, engage targets, manage distributed operations). This post 
asserts that the technologies being developed and deployed by these efforts will 
eventually force future mission command capabilities to include abilities to detect, 
analyze, and react to man-machine interface deception / surprise events at all echelons 
of command. The need for these new / improved decision support capabilities will be 
driven by the challenges of creating accurate Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) estimates while encountering increased deception / surprise 
technologies. These deception technologies are appearing at every echelon of mission 
command and are being driven, in part, by the ongoing commercial integration of the 
international network of Information Technology (IT) systems and the international 
network of Operational Technology (OT) systems. 
A lesson learned from the use of the Stuxnet 
malware to cause Iranian centrifuges to self-
destruct[1] is that malware can be used to 
achieve tactical surprise of human operators. 
The centrifuge control man-machine interface 
was exploited to deceive human operators 
concerning the true state of the autonomous 
control system as the machines were being 
commanded to destroy themselves. The 
Iranian operators were unaware for a lengthy 
period that they were being deceived by their monitoring software and they were 
surprised when they discovered the extent of the damage to the centrifuges. The 
centrifuge-control, man-machine interface was informing the human operators that 
everything was proceeding as commanded when in fact the machines were shaking 
themselves apart. 
It is apparent from many recent events / results, [2], [3], [7], [8], [9], [10] that similar outcomes are 
now possible at each echelon of command (individual deception outcomes at the “tip of 
the spear,” as well as tactical surprise outcomes, operational surprise outcomes, and 
strategic surprise outcomes). This note provides a summary of some results in 
achieving distributed state estimation and control of complex, networked systems. This 
post asserts that a wide variety of distributed control systems, including national 
infrastructure systems and possibly military command and control systems are subject 
to deliberate and inadvertent cyber and physical anomalies (failure modes) and states 
the author’s opinions regarding the implications of the ongoing integration of IT and OT 
for future Mission Command decisions and future OE state estimation results. 
DISCUSSION 
By the end of WWII, one result of the years of repeated iterations of division command 
and staff interactions producing and executing operations orders (OPORDs) was the 
ability to rapidly (in less than 24 hours) generate and execute a one-page division 
OPORD to meet command intent at the operational level. At the end of the Army XXI 
development and fielding exercises shortly before Operation Desert Storm, a capability 
was demonstrated to generate and modify / execute a division OPORD in less than 
eight hours to meet command intent. When NATO and other nations supported the 
United States in responding to the 9-11 attacks by removing the Taliban from power in 
Afghanistan, one of the systems deployed to assess the situation regarding Afghan 
hamlet and village support for the new government was the Effects-Based Assessment 
Support System (E-BASS).[6] E-BASS enabled the rapid assessment of national-level 
outcomes regarding the status of meeting command intent at the strategic level.  
 
Figure 1. Plans are worthless, but planning is everything[5] 
An assessment repeatedly mentioned by President Eisenhower regarding military 
planning is that “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything”[4], [5] (Figure 1).  The 
planning process is necessary for successful operations, but plans created through the 
planning process are usually not executed as written. Given the current dramatic 
changes in the OE driven by IT/OT integration, that assertion has probably never been 
truer. The current and future challenge is to speed up the processes of incrementally 
adjusting plans so that commanders at each echelon can consistently stay “inside the 
decision cycle” of opposing commanders (i.e., not be surprised by opposing force 
actions / activities) and successfully “adjust fire” to meet command intent as the 
situation evolves. 
As the Army works to create crew-served weapons systems and organizations for 
executing future operations, the wide range of OE to be encountered by these 
organizations remains largely unknown. What is known is the certainty of the continued 
expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT) capabilities of the interdependent networks of 
sensors and actuators and the continued deployment of the Fifth Generation (5G) of the 
long-term evolution (LTE) cell-based communications capabilities. 
The rest of this post attempts to provide a summary of the expected technical 
implications of these two ongoing evolutions for future mission command decision 
support applications and operational environment ISR state estimation applications. The 
assertions made in the note are dependent upon the assumptions below regarding 
these two dominant technical trends: 
1. The IoT will continue to expand and will 
result in billions of vulnerable sensors and 
actuators subject to being exploited to 
surprise individual, tactical, operational, and 
strategic echelons regarding the state of the 
OE. Distributed clocks can now be routinely 
synchronized to within 1 nanosecond[13] and 
more precise synchronizations are possible. 
2. The pace of 5G communications 
deployments will continue to accelerate 
and the resulting increase in distributed 
communications capabilities will support 
massive increases in the sharing of data 
among the IoT sensing and actuating 
devices and their associated automated 
control systems. 
The result of these two trends is to 
increase the ability of threats (from script 
kiddies to nation states) to exploit ongoing technical advances to achieve surprise at 
multiple echelons of command. 
The implications of the recent malware attacks on critical infrastructures around the 
world and the demonstrated ability to compromise sensors at the lowest level have 
profound implications for future ISR systems as well as for future mission command 
decision support tools. One approach for abstracting the various processes for 
accumulating evidence for making decisions is the data-information-knowledge-wisdom 
(DIKW) triangle[11] (Figure 2). While formal logical analysis is preferred for achieving 
provably-correct results, the key challenge is that proving the absence of malware is an 
undecidable problem (like the halting problem). Thus, since formally proving that 
malware is not present in a working system is not a computable problem, most product-
line solutions for complex systems (cars, aircraft, missile engagement) use algorithmic 
logic to achieve resilient control of distributed systems. The algorithmic logic includes 
both event-based algorithms and physics-based algorithms and the available solutions 
to the set of discrete and continuous constraints is not provably correct. Also, most 
humans-in-the-loop use intuitive logic based upon previous experiences to make 
decisions. 
 
Figure 2. The data, information, knowledge, wisdom (DIKW) triangle. 
In addition, achieving a common operational picture across echelons of mission 
command is a very difficult problem. Temporal, spatial, and spectral scales of interest 
span multiple orders of magnitude in their respective domains, making consistent 
visualizations of the situation very challenging. 
Previously, commanders and staffs did not have to consider the possibility of opponents 
being able to capture hundreds of thousands of vulnerable sensors and actuators to 
perform deception / surprise operations. However, massive Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attacks have occurred 
through the capture and exploitation of 
hundreds of thousands of home local area 
network wireless routers and other devices.[10]  
Such results demonstrate the ability to exploit 
vulnerable IoT devices, including capture of 
vulnerable sensors and actuators, to affect 
estimates over time scales of nanoseconds 
to years; over spatial scales of millimeters to 
thousands of kilometers; and over spectral scales that span the electromagnetic 
spectrum.  
Moreover, deception / surprise has been 
demonstrated to be possible at the lowest 
possible level / echelon of man-machine 
interfaces.[9] Thus, a security service critical to 
avoiding surprise at every echelon of 
command will be a service to ensure non-
repudiation of data being shared among 
nodes in the state estimation and control 
devices within each echelon and 
subsequently of data being shared between 
echelons. A recent cadet blockchain 
project [7],[8] demonstrated one approach for 
attaining non-repudiation of data shared 
among a whitelist of trusted partners to increase trust in shared data. Also, the man-in-
the-middle attack of sensor data project[9] demonstrated that even non-repudiation is 
insufficient to prevent sharing of bad data if the data can be corrupted by changing data 
in the payload of packets between the sensor and higher-level applications. The 
corruption of data is possible even if the data packets are being sent in accordance with 
data transmission protocols over a trusted Ethernet network link. An idea which may be 
investigated in the future to address the data corruption result is to use redundant 
sensors to measure critical parameters, apply the blockchain result to share data 
among multiple sensors, and use a voting scheme to identify compromised/failed 
sensors.  
A series of smart grid projects, including 
those discussed in these references,[7],[8],[9] 
have been coordinated over the past four 
years by Dr. Aaron St. Leger of the 
Department of Electrical Engineering and 
Computer Science at the United States 
Military Academy. For two years, a series 
of joint microgrid experiments involving 
Anomaly Detection of Cyber physical Systems (ADCPS) were supported by the Office 
of Naval Research (ONR).[14],[15],[16] Six microgrid 
emulators and/or simulators located at six institutions 
in five states (Idaho National Laboratory [INL], Army 
Research Laboratory [ARL], Iowa State University 
[ISU], United States Naval Academy [USNA], United 
States Air Force Academy [USAFA], and United 
States Military Academy [USMA]), were used to 
conduct experiments to improve technologies 
available for detecting, analyzing, and reacting to 
cyber and physical anomalies (failure modes) 
affecting distributed state estimation and control of 
the smart grid. 
The ADCPS team in the past has applied machine 
learning (ML) approaches for identifying cyber and 
physical anomalies. Cyberspace has joined the land, 
sea, air and space domains of warfare as the fifth 
domain of warfare. The Department of Defense has recently issued the top-level 
operations document for conducting warfare in cyberspace.[17] It may be the case that 
future ML approaches may be useful in answering questions related to cyber key 
terrain. ML may be useful in answering questions such as: 
1. How do we detect cyber-physical failures? 
2. How do we categorize cyber-physical failures? 
3. How do we measure the impact of cyber-physical failures? 
4. How do we measure the resilience of cyber-physical systems subject to cyber-
physical failures? 
However, a growing problem in the application of ML systems is the possibility of 
adversarial activities affecting the usefulness of ML results.[12] Thus, another possible 
application of non-repudiation of shared information is the use of permissioned 
blockchain technology to improve the integrity of ML results. In addition, a barrier to 
wider use of ML results is the “black box” nature of recommended actions and the 
brittleness of the solutions for rare events. Thus, another line of possible investigations 
is to determine the possibility of use of ML technologies to incrementally improve the 
algorithmic models resulting from physics-based analysis. 
In any event, recent cyber events affecting a broad range of critical infrastructures have 
verified the importance of improving available technologies for understanding the 
behaviors of distributed complex systems and especially in improving the capabilities for 
ensuring the non-repudiation of data received from the bottom of the data-information-
knowledge-wisdom food chain, that level being the level of sensors and actuators. Since 
success in cyberspace operations will be critical for ensuring success in all combat 
domains, a key capability in future warfare will be recognizing the high ground of key 
terrain for cyberspace operations and ensuring that commanders have the confidence 
that they can recognize that cyberspace high ground, and can seize and exploit it. 
Over 30 years ago the Directorate of Combat 
Developments of the U.S. Army Infantry Center 
developed a requirements document indicating the 
need to develop robotic systems to aid maneuver 
force commanders in conducting Reconnaissance, 
Selection, and Occupation of Position (RSOP) 
operations for maneuver forces. Today, this ISR 
capability is available with the emergence of a range 
of robotic vehicles, including swarms of quadcopters, 
which have demonstrated capabilities to improve the 
commander’s estimate of the situation and reduce the 
attrition of forces in conducting RSOP of physical 
terrain. 
Today and for the foreseeable future, 
commanders need a similar capability to 
identify elements of key terrain in 
cyberspace.  Cyber operations are 
necessary for the execution of operations 
across the domains of warfare to meet the 
intent of the commander. This is true 
because the intent of the commander is 
mathematically the only stationary point in 
the evolution of the dynamics of the state 
space of measurements of variables across 
the temporal, spatial, and spectral scales of 
warfare. That is, in the American doctrine 
of warfare, everything is subject to change during a combat operation except the intent 
of the commander. Thus, commanders at each echelon are expected to understand the 
intent of the highest level of command and exercise “good military judgement” to adjust 
operations at their echelon to meet command intent. 
CONCLUSION 
This doctrine is consistent with Eisenhower’s observation that “Plans are worthless, but 
planning is everything.”[4],[5] Humans understand command intent through the planning 
process and apply intuitive logic to adjust operations to meet command intent. 
Unfortunately, technology is currently inadequate for machine “understanding” of intent 
to match human understanding of intent. The ongoing information systems revolution 
has transformed the way that humans interact with each other and how machines 
interact with humans. Thus, we are faced with a need to be continuously suspicious of 
what our machines are telling us because we know that we cannot prove that they have 
not been compromised by malware. Tools are needed to “trust but verify” that our 
machines are performing as expected. Like the capability available today to deploy 
robotic vehicles to reduce force attrition when conducting RSOP operations of physical 
terrain, commanders need similar tools for conducting RSOP operations of cyber 
terrain. 
If you enjoyed this post, please also read: 
Our companion piece to this blog post, A New Era of Network Architecture. 
Takeaways Learned about the Future of the AI Battlefield, and our associated 
Crowdsourcing the Future of the AI Battlefield paper. 
The Guy Behind the Guy: AI as the Indispensable Marshal, by Messrs. Brady 
Moore and Chris Sauceda. 
The Human Targeting Solution: An AI Story, by CW3 Jesse R. Crifasi. 
Influence at Machine Speed: The Coming of AI-Powered Propaganda, by MAJ 
Chris Telley. 
Dr. John James commanded three times at the company level (twice with ADA units in 
Germany and as a District Senior Advisor in Vietnam). His last active duty assignment 
was as Director of the TRADOC AI Center where he led development of over thirty 
small knowledge-based decision support systems, at least two of which were used for 
over 25 years. As a contractor with research engineers from the Lockheed Advanced 
Technology Laboratories (ATL), he investigated implementation of netted, distributed 
control of theater-level air defense fires for the Medium, Extended Air Defense System 
(MEADS). He has been teaching at USMA as a civilian faculty member since 2000. 
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